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Analysing the Gender Wage Gap Using Personnel Records 
of a Large German Company
*
 
We use monthly personnel records of a large German company to analyse the gender wage 
gap (GWG). Main findings are: (1) the unconditional GWG is 15 percent for blue-collar and 
26 percent for white-collar workers; (2) conditional on tenure, entry age, schooling, and 
working hours, the GWG is 13 percent for blue-collar as well as for white-collar workers; (3) 
after additionally controlling for hierarchical levels, the GWG is less than 4 percent for blue-
collar and 8 percent for white-collar workers; (4) Oaxaca decompositions reveal that the 
unexplained part of the GWG is 87 percent for blue-collar workers and 46 percent for white-
collar workers; (5) males have larger absolute wage growths than females; (6) the relative 
GWG gets larger with tenure for blue-collar but smaller for white-collar workers; (7) individual 
absenteeism has no significant impact on the GWG; (8) the gender gap in absenteeism is 
between 26 and 46 percent. Overall, the results are consistent with statistical discrimination 
explanations of the gender wage gap, though we cannot rule out other forms of 
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1.  Introduction 
Research on wages of men and women report consistently a gender wage gap (GWG in 
the following) unconditional and conditional on important control variables as well as 
for different countries, industries, and decades (e.g., Cain, 1986; Gunderson, 1989; 
Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2003). Neumark (1999, 
p. 414) states: “There are two dominant explanations of these wage differentials that are 
the basis for most empirical research on this topic. The first is that employers 
discriminate against women or minorities in some fashion that results in lower wages 
for them even when they are equally productive. The second is that women or 
minorities come to the market with productivity shortfalls.” Discrimination can take 
several forms (Cain, 1986). For example, a firm might pay females lower wages than 
males because of employer, employee, or customer taste discrimination (Becker, 1971). 
Another form of discrimination is the use of group statistics (e.g., lower average 
productivity of women) as a proxy for unobserved productivity. Such statistical 
discrimination, however, is hard to measure and “has received relatively little empirical 
attention with regard to wage differentials by race and sex” (Neumark, 1999, p. 416).  
Several studies note that the GWG is smaller under piece-rate than under time-rate 
based remuneration schemes (Jirjahn and Stephan, 2004; Petersen, Snartland, and 
Meyersson Milgrom, 2005). As wages largely reflect productivity under piece-rates, the 
GWG rather reflects differences in productivity than discrimination. Under time-rates 
all sources of discrimination might add to the initial GWG due to productivity 
differences. However, this kind of studies cannot distinguish between different types of 
taste discrimination and statistical discrimination. Other studies looked at entry wages 
and the evolution of the wage gap (Neumark, 1999; Altonji and Pierret, 2001). 
Statistical discrimination predicts that the impact of the group variable (gender or race) 
gets smaller with tenure because the employer learns about individual productivity. The 
results of Altonji and Pierret (2001), however, are not very supportive of this prediction 
because the wage gap between blacks and whites is virtually zero when entering the 
labour market and rises with experience.      
This paper adds a new perspective to the explanation of the persistence of the GWG by 
looking at monthly personnel records of a large German company from January 1999 to 2 
 
December 2005.
1 As a special feature, these personnel records include information on 
contractual as well as on absent (sickness) working hours. The latter might be used as a 
proxy for productivity. However, since the firm has to pay the contractual working 
hours regardless of absenteeism, it seems reasonable to interpret absenteeism as costs.  
We find that the GWG is remarkably reduced but still significant after controlling for 
differences in worker characteristics (tenure, entry age, schooling, and monthly working 
hours). Moreover, Oaxaca decompositions reveal that a substantial part of the GWG 
remains unexplained. Analysing wage careers and the evolution of the GWG, we find 
that absolute wage growth is larger for males than females. The relative GWG, 
however, gets smaller with tenure for white-collar workers but larger for blue-collar 
workers. This difference might be explained by the firm’s training decisions (‘self-
fulfilling prophecy’) and the type of skills acquired during training, which differ 
between production (firm specific skills) and administration work (general skills). 
Including individual absenteeism in the estimates does not reduce the GWG 
significantly. The sizable GWG might be explained by statistical discrimination against 
women due to their higher average absenteeism rates, which have also a higher variance 
than among men, – a point that was also raised in previous studies (Corcoran and 
Duncan, 1979; Osterman, 1979; Kahn, 1981; Osterman, 1981). We explain this finding 
partly in a simple microeconomic model, which combines the cost aspect of 
absenteeism with gender based statistical discrimination by a profit-maximizing firm. 
Policy implications are drawn from the empirical and theoretical findings. 
The subsequent paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a literature review. In 
Section 3, the personnel data set and the firm are briefly described, which is 
accompanied by descriptive statistics about employment, wages, and absenteeism. The 
regression analyses follow in Section 4, which contains estimates of the GWG, an 
                                                 
1 Earlier studies examining personnel records of a single firm are Malkiel and Malkiel (1979), who 
analysed small cross section samples of high qualified professionals in the late 1960s, and Osterman 
(1979), who analysed sex discrimination in a cross section of professional employees from 1976. Ichino 
and Moretti (2006) recently analysed absenteeism and wages with personnel data of an Italian bank. Their 
research focus, however, was quite special (menstrual cycle) and different from ours. Dohmen, Lehmann, 
and Zaiceva (2008) use personnel records of a Russian firm to analyse the effect of transition on the 
GWG. Absenteeism is not incorporated in their study. 3 
 
Oaxaca decomposition of the GWG, gender differences in wage careers, evolution of 
the GWG over tenure, wage effect of absenteeism, and gender gap in absenteeism. 
Section 5 presents a simple economic model, which combines the wage cost aspect of 
absenteeism with statistical discrimination, and gives some policy implications.            
 
2.  Literature Review 
Women in Germany – and not just here – still earn significantly less than men, even 
though the difference diminished clearly as studies with the German socio-economic 
panel (GSOEP) (Prey, 1999) and the German IAB employment sample (Fitzenberger 
and Wunderlich, 2002; Gartner and Rässler, 2005) show. Apart from the influence of 
individual characteristics, research has put especially the effects from employer 
discrimination on the GWG to the fore. On the one hand, discrimination of women can 
be the consequence of preferences and incomplete competition. If there is a ‘taste for 
discrimination’ the management or the employees of the firm prefer to cooperate with 
men (Becker, 1971; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 2006). On the other hand, there can be 
statistical discrimination. In our context, firms use the gender of an employee to predict 
his or her productivity in case of incomplete information about productivity (Aigner and 
Cain, 1977). For example, unscheduled absenteeism could have a negative effect on 
productivity. 
Absenteeism is costly for firms due to various reasons (Allen, 1981a). First, the absent 
worker has to be replaced by someone who is probably less productive. Second, in case 
of unexpected absenteeism managerial resources have to be shifted from more 
productive uses to level out the failure. Against this background and proceeding from 
the assumption that women on average miss their jobs more often and for a longer time 
a profit-maximizing employer could decide to hire less women or to pay them lower 
wages. 
Most existing studies about absenteeism at the workplace conclude that women are 
absent more often than men. Mastekaasa and Modesta Olsen (1998) show that there are 
incentives for statistical discrimination of women due to their higher absence times with 
data from civil servants in Norway. They find that the stronger responsibilities of 4 
 
women for child care have no influence on differences in absence times between 
women and men, in contrast to Vistnes (1997) who works with data from the US 
National Medical Expenditure Study. Corresponding with studies from Leigh (1983) 
and Paringer (1983), Vistnes (1997) shows that the health status is a more important 
predictor of absenteeism than economic factors (e.g., granting of sick leave, existence of 
health insurance). Allen (1981b) analyses the probability of absenteeism in dependence 
from various economic and socio-demographic characteristics. He concludes that the 
observed higher absence times of women can be explained almost completely by 
differences in marginal incomes and working hour flexibility. 
One of a few studies on absenteeism in context of the GWG has been carried out by 
Corcoran and Duncan (1979). They use the ninth wave of the US Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), a household survey which includes detailed information on 
work history, on-the job-training, and absenteeism. By estimating earnings functions 
and using the decomposition method developed by Oaxaca (1973), they find that the 
higher absent working hours of women account for a quite low share of the wage 
differential between the sexes. 
While most studies on absenteeism use survey data, only a few analyse personnel data. 
Malkiel and Malkiel (1973) estimate earnings functions and use Oaxaca decomposition 
on a sample of professional employees from a single corporation. They find a negative 
influence of the absence rate on the wage level, which is significant only for female 
employees. Osterman (1979) analyses sex discrimination in a large publishing firm in 
New York City by estimating wage differentials within similar jobs. In his study, the 
negative influence of absenteeism on wages also turned out as significant only for 
women. Ichino and Moretti (2006) use personnel data of a large Italian bank to analyse 
if differences between women and men with regard to absenteeism are due to biological 
differences (menstrual cycle), which would have consequences for wages and salaries of 
women. They find that the probability of missing work increases significantly for 
women relative to men 28 days after the preceding absenteeism spell. The effect 
disappears for employees older than 45 years. In their model, the authors assume that 
the employer cannot observe individual productivity directly and instead uses 
observable characteristics (e.g., absenteeism) to predict productivity. The results 5 
 
confirm the existence of statistical discrimination due to the higher absenteeism rate of 
women: The GWG which is 13.5 percent in the sample would be reduced by 1.6 
percentage points – or 11.8 percent – if the average woman would not suffer from 
menstrual symptoms, at least in this organization. 
For Germany, we find only one study analysing causes of absenteeism on basis of 
personnel data: Stephan (1991) uses data from more than 10,000 employees of a large 
German company. She investigates the hypothesis that absenteeism which is not due to 
illness is used to realize the optimal labour supply. It turns out that individual 
characteristics – among them gender – have a significant influence on absence times. 
However, there are hints that especially the higher absenteeism of women could be due 
to the endowment of their workplaces. 
Few international comparative studies analyse the influence from the institutional 
framework in which absenteeism occurs. Osterkamp and Röhn (2007) construct a panel 
of 20 OECD countries for the years 1996 to 2002 from the OECD Health Data-base and 
the WHO Health For All Database. Frick and Malo (2005) use data from the 2000 
European Survey on Working Conditions on 12 countries belonging to the EU. Both 
studies develop an index measuring the ‘generosity’ of sickness benefits systems. They 
find this generosity to be an important predictor for the number of days absent.  
The German sickness benefits system belongs apart from the Swedish and the 
Norwegian one to the most ‘generous’ among OECD and EU countries respectively. 
Sick pay in Germany is regulated in the Act on Continued Payment of Remuneration 
(‘Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz’). An employee who is sick for more than three days has to 
present a medical certificate of sickness from his physician. From October 1996 to 1998 
the law provided an option to limit the continued pay specified by the law, but in many 
collective wage agreements the level was fixed to 100 percent. Therefore, this option 
was cancelled after a change of government in 1998 (Thalmaier, 2002). Since 1999 sick 
employees have a legitimate claim to 100 percent wage replacement from their 
employer, for a period up to six weeks. In case of longer sickness absence due to the 
same disease, there is a claim of 70 percent of the previous regular remuneration for 78 
weeks within three years, which is paid by the health insurance. Although the German 
sickness benefits system is quite generous, we find Germany in the centre of the 6 
 
distribution of absence days (with an average of 6.89 days absent) for the year 2000 
(Frick and Malo, 2005). In the 2000 wave of the GSOEP, 50 percent of respondents 
stated to have been absent due to sickness for at least one day (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2006). 
 
3.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1  The Firm 
The data set was extracted from computerised personnel records of a large German 
limited company which produces innovative products for the world market. The 
company has a works council and is subject to an industry wide collective contract. The 
personnel records contain information for all employees in the company’s headquarter 
on a monthly basis from January 1999 to December 2005. The used sample includes 
blue-collar and white-collar workers without apprentices, workers in early retirement 
schemes, and long-term absent workers (at least one month absent). Moreover, 
observations with missing values in any of the used variables are dropped. In sum, the 
total number of observations (individuals) during the 84 month observation period is 
50,722 (786) for blue-collar workers and 73,174 (1,250) for white-collar workers in an 
unbalanced panel design.  
 
3.2  Employment 
Figure 1 gives an impression of the firm’s overall employment development from 
January 1999 (month 1) to December 2005 (month 84). Total employment was about 
1,300 in early 1999 and increased to 1,600 in 2003. Since then, employment decreased 
and was about 1,400 in the end of 2005. The firm employs more white-collar than blue-
collar workers. Both types of workers follow the same overall employment trend. 
-  Insert Figure 1 about here 7 
 
Figure 2 depicts the share of female employment. The share of females in total 
employment increased from 23 percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2005. This trend can be 
observed for blue-collar as well as for white-collar workers. However, the share of 
females is higher among white-collar workers than among blue-collar workers. 
-  Insert Figure 2 about here 
The firm has a hierarchy according to the wage groups of the collective contract (see 
Table 1). Table 2 and 3 indicate that females work on average at lower levels. 
Especially at the highest levels few or no females are employed. 
-  Insert Table 1 about here 
-  Insert Table 2 about here 
-  Insert Table 3 about here 
Further information on the characteristics of male and female blue-collar and white-
collar workers are summarised in Table 4. Men have on average longer tenure than 
women. While male blue-collar workers are on average younger than female blue-collar 
workers when they enter the firm, the opposite is found for white-collar workers. Men 
have on average more schooling than women. For example, 40 percent of male but only 
23 percent of female white-collar workers have a university degree. The significant 
differences between average male and female worker characteristics make it necessary 
to control for these variables in regression analyses. A complete list of the variables 
used in the regression analyses and detailed descriptive statistics can be found in Table 
A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. 
-  Insert Table 4 about here 
 
3.3  Wages 
Table 5 informs about average nominal gross hourly wages for male and female 
workers and the differences between them. Average wages are 14.94 Euros for blue-
collar workers and 23.41 Euros for white-collar workers. Male blue-collar (white-collar) 
workers earn on average 2.16 (5.31) Euros more than female blue-collar (white-collar) 8 
 
workers. The gender differences are highly significant in a two-sample t-test. A further 
description of the wage distributions of male and female workers can be found in 
Figures 3 and 4, in which kernel density estimates are presented.  
-  Insert Table 5 about here 
-  Insert Figure 3 about here 
-  Insert Figure 4 about here 
The development of mean nominal wages in Euros by months for male and female blue-
collar and white-collar workers is given in Figure 5. There is a positive trend with some 
spikes which indicate the agreed wage increases in collective contracts. Male workers 
earn on average more than female workers and white-collar workers earn on average 
more than blue-collar workers. Note that male blue-collar workers also earn less than 
female white-collar workers. 
-  Insert Figure 5 about here 
The female-male wage ratios are depicted in Figure 6. Female blue-collar workers earn 
on average between 14 and 15 percent less than male blue-collar workers. While the 
GWG is quite stable over time for blue-collar workers, the female-male wage ratio is 
increasing for white-collar workers from 77 percent in 1999 to 80 percent in 2005.  
-  Insert Figure 6 about here 
 
3.4  Absenteeism 
Figure 7 gives an impression of the amount of lost working hours due to absenteeism 
and the associated wage costs. An advantage of using absent working hours instead of 
absent working days is that females work on average fewer working hours. Therefore, 
the associated wage costs for women would be overestimated when using absent 
working days. The sum of total absent working hours ranges from 4,000 hours to more 
than 12,000 hours per month. Most of the spikes appear during the winter months (e.g., 
cold, flu). As a lower boundary for the costs of absenteeism, the wage costs are 
calculated by multiplying the hourly wage with the number of absent working hours for 9 
 
every worker in every month.
2 The sums of total monthly wage costs due to 
absenteeism range from 50,000 Euros to 250,000 Euros. To get an impression of the 
relative magnitude of theses costs, we divided the monthly wage costs due to 
absenteeism by total monthly wage costs. Figure 8 shows that absenteeism is 
responsible for 2 to 5 percent of the wage bill. Thus, absenteeism is quite costly for the 
firm.    
-  Insert Figure 7 about here 
-  Insert Figure 8 about here 
Table 6 shows that the average numbers of absent working hours per month are 7.14 for 
blue-collar workers and 3.42 for white-collar workers. Female blue-collar (white-collar) 
workers are on average 2.20 (0.72) hours more absent than male blue-collar (white-
collar) workers. The differences are highly significant in a two-sample t-test. Moreover, 
it appears that standard deviations are larger for females. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate 
graphically that means of absenteeism are larger for females than for males. This 
finding gives rise to the issue of statistical discrimination, which is discussed later. 
-  Insert Table 6 about here 
-  Insert Figure 9 about here 
-  Insert Figure 10 about here 
 
4.  Regression Analyses 
4.1  Gender Wage Gap 
To exploit the panel character of our data set, we estimate log-linear earnings functions 
with random effects GLS (general least squares) models and heteroskedasticity robust 
                                                 
2 Additional costs of absenteeism might occur, for example, due to replacement costs (e.g., temporary 
help service) and quasi-fixed employment cost (e.g., investments in firm-specific human capital).  10 
 
standard errors.
3 The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly gross wages in Euros 
in a given month. Female and month dummies are the only explanatory variables in our 
first specification. The results in the second columns of Table 7 and 8 indicate a highly 
significant GWG of approximately 15 percent for blue-collar workers and 26 percent for 
white-collar workers. Including additional variables to control for tenure, entry age, 
schooling, and working hours reduces the GWG to approximately 13 percent for blue-
collar as well as for white-collar workers (see Pfeifer 2008 for a discussion on the 
impact of the different control variables). After additionally controlling for hierarchical 
levels, the GWG is still significant but reduced to less than 4 percent for blue-collar 
workers and 8 percent for white-collar workers.  
-  Insert Table 7 about here 
-  Insert Table 8 about here 
While the inclusion of tenure, entry age, schooling, and working hours reflects the 
importance to control for differences in worker characteristics between men and 
women, the results for hierarchical levels need a short discussion. After levels are 
included in the estimates, female wages are still lower than male wages but the GWG is 
remarkably reduced. This finding indicates that females self-select into jobs at lower 
levels and the firm selects them less often to higher levels (Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller, 1997; Pfeifer, 2007). It is consistent with results from previous studies, 
which report that segregation of men and women in different occupations account for a 
large part of the GWG (e.g., Meyersson Milgrom, Petersen, and Snartland, 2001; Datta 
Gupta and Rothstein, 2005; Dohmen, Lehmann, and Zaiceva, 2008). Since different 
jobs of females and males might already reflect discrimination, the total GWG is 
underestimated if the estimates control for jobs (e.g., Gunderson, 1989; Kidd and 
Shannon, 1996; Barnet-Verzat and Wolff, 2008). Thus, we use specifications without 
levels in most of the subsequent estimates.        
 
                                                 
3 The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects shows that the random effects model 
is more appropriate than OLS because the variance of the individual error term is significantly different 
from zero. 11 
 
4.2  Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap 
In this section, we use the decomposition method introduced by Oaxaca (1973), which 
decomposes the wage differential in two components. The first component comprises 
differences in the explanatory variables (explained effect), and the second one measures 
the effect of a different treatment of men and women with otherwise equal 
characteristics (unexplained effect). As reference group for weighting differences in 
individual characteristics we choose men. This implies the assumption that the male 
wage structure would arise if there were no discrimination. The decomposition equation 
then results as follows in (1): 
(1)  () () ˆˆ ˆ ln ln ( ) ( ) ′ ′′ −= −+ −  	   
  	 
 M FM F M m F F
explained differential unexplained differential
ww X X X ββ β  
() ln M w  is the average log male wage and  ( ) ln M w  is the average log female wage.  ′ M X  
and  ′ F X  are vectors which contain the means of individual characteristics for each 
gender.  ˆ
M β  and  ˆ
F β  are the estimated coefficients. Oaxaca (1973) refers to the 
unexplained part of the differential as discrimination. But when interpreting the results 
one must have in mind that parts of the wage differential, which are not explained by 
individual characteristics, do not necessarily come from discrimination. They could also 
be due to differences in unobserved characteristics between men and women (Achatz, 
Gartner, and Glück, 2005). Table 9 and 10 show the estimates for blue-collar and white-
collar workers respectively. The first column in each table contains the estimates for 
men and the second column the estimates for women. Columns three to six present the 
results of the decomposition. 
-  Insert Table 9  about here 
-  Insert Table 10 about here 
The rates of return to tenure are in favour of men in both groups, while for entry age this 
holds only for white-collar workers. One reason might be that firm-specific human 
capital is more important for blue-collar workers, while administrative work typically 
requires rather general qualifications. Therefore, higher entry age as a proxy for general 
skills is advantageous for white-collar but not for blue-collar workers. Apprenticeship 12 
 
training increases wages of male blue-collar workers by 7.8 percent, while we find no 
significant effect for females. Conversely, the rates of return to high school and 
university degrees among white-collar workers are larger for females. Moreover, we 
find no hint for a wage penalty for working fewer hours for blue-collar women, which 
might reflect a selection of women into jobs suitable for part-time work. In case of 
white-collar workers, the number of working hours has no effect on women’s wages, 
whereas we find a positive effect for men.  
The results of the decomposition support these findings. The number of monthly 
working hours has almost no influence on the size of the GWG for blue-collar workers. 
For white collar-workers the differences in the coefficients contribute with about 22 
percent to the GWG. We find no significant effect of entry age on the GWG for blue-
collar workers. In case of white-collar workers both effects, explained and unexplained, 
are highly significant, but the explained effect is in contrast to the unexplained effect 
rather inferior. This also holds after controlling for hierarchical levels, even if the 
effects decrease as the results in Table 11 show.
4 A reason might be that men and 
women have different employment histories when entering the firm, with more gaps in 
female employment histories due to family responsibilities. Corcoran and Duncan 
(1979) find that a different work history contributes with 28 percent to the GWG in the 
PSID data.  
-  Insert Table 11 about here 
The coefficients for tenure, entry age, and university degree decrease considerably after 
controlling for hierarchical levels, which shows the high correlation of these variables. 
At the same time, the coefficient for monthly working hours increases for both, men and 
women, and the explained differential becomes significant in the decomposition 
equation. Differences in mean characteristics have a highly significant influence on the 
GWG at all levels. We find a slight advantage for women at level 2, while from level 3 
upwards there is an advantage for men, which increases with level. Differences in level 
                                                 
4 As already mentioned in Section 3.2, there are no men working at level 1 and no women working at 
level 6 and 7 among blue-collar workers. Therefore, we do not carry out estimations with hierarchical 
levels for blue-collar workers. 13 
 
coefficients do not contribute to the size of the GWG. This finding supports the 
inferences from Section 4.1 that females self-select into lower levels and are less often 
selected into higher levels by the firm. 
Table 12 summarises the decomposition results. The explained differential contributes 
with only 1.9 percent to the GWG for blue-collar workers. Consequently, 87 percent of 
the total GWG are not explained by differences in individual characteristics. For white-
collar workers about 13.8 and 17.5 percent of the GWG, respectively, can be attributed 
to differences in mean characteristics. As expected from the previous results the part of 
the GWG due to discrimination decreases substantially when controlling for hierarchical 
levels. 
-  Insert Table 12 about here 
Because the unexplained part of the GWG remains substantially large after controlling 
for several individual characteristics (87 percent for blue-collar workers, about 46 and 
28 percent for white-collar workers, respectively), it is important to analyse further 
possible explanations. One explanation might be statistical discrimination due to on 
average higher absenteeism rates of women. Before focusing on this issue, we take a 
closer look at different wage careers of men and women and at the evolution of the 
GWG. 
     
4.3  Wage Careers and Evolution of the Gender Wage Gap 
The coefficients of tenure, squared tenure, and cubed tenure
5 from the previous 
estimates in Section 4.2 are used to predict the wage-tenure profiles in Figures 11 and 
12, in which entry wages are predicted at tenure of zero and means of all other 
covariates. Male blue-collar workers start on average with a predicted wage of 13.5 
Euros and female blue-collar workers with wages below 13 Euros. Male white-collar 
workers start on average also with higher wages (18 Euros) than females (15 Euros). 
The lower gender gap in entry wages among blue-collar workers might be explained by 
                                                 
5 Higher order terms of tenure were not significant and did not change the predicted wage profiles. 14 
 
differences in entry age (see Table 4 in Section 3.2), which is a proxy for acquired 
general human capital and positively correlated with wages – at least for white-collar 
workers (see previous estimates). Female blue-collar workers are on average 1.5 years 
older than males when entering the firm, whereas female white-collar workers are on 
average 2.5 years younger than males. Except for female blue-collar workers, the wage-
tenure profiles are quite steep until 20 years of tenure. Overall, the wage-tenure profiles 
are steeper for white-collar than for blue-collar workers, which might be explained by 
deferred compensation schemes that are less important in production jobs (Lazear, 
1979). The absolute wage differentials between males and females increase with tenure 
because males have larger absolute wage growths. 
-  Insert Figure 11 about here 
-  Insert Figure 12 about here 
To analyse the evolution of the relative GWG over tenure, earnings functions are 
estimated with interaction terms of the female dummy with tenure, squared tenure, and 
cubed tenure (see Table 13). For an easier interpretation of the results, Figure 13 plots 
the predicted GWG in dependence of tenure. The wage gap of female blue-collar 
workers is about minus 7 percent in their early career and decreasing with tenure. After 
10 years the GWG is about minus 12 percent and the GWG reaches its minimum with 
nearly minus 18 percent after 26 years of tenure. Among white-collar workers the GWG 
in the early career is about minus 15 percent and, thus, twice as large as for blue-collar 
workers. The evolution of the GWG is also quite different, because it continuously 
increases to approximately minus 9 percent after 30 years of tenure. We estimated 
additional specifications which control for hierarchical levels (see Table 13). Although 
the GWGs are smaller (see Section 4.1), the evolution of the GWGs is quite similar (see 
Figure 14).
6 
-  Insert Table 13 about here 
                                                 
6 Since the general GWG has been reduced over the last decades and women with more tenure have 
entered the labour market earlier, cohort effects might play an important role. However, our results 
proved to be robust after controlling for the year of birth or age instead of entry age. Additionally, we 
estimated fixed effects models (interaction female and tenure but no female dummy) that produced the 
same results as the interaction terms in the random effects models. 15 
 
-  Insert Figure 13 about here 
-  Insert Figure 14 about here 
The reduction of the GWG among white-collar workers is in line with predictions from 
statistical discrimination and employer learning (Altonji and Pierret, 2001). Because the 
firm has more uncertainty about females’ than males’ individual productivity, the firm 
pays lower starting wages to females. If the firm learns that women are not less 
productive than males, it will adjust wages and, hence, the GWG will be reduced. 
The story of statistical discrimination does not seem to make sense for blue-collar 
workers, because the GWG gets larger with tenure. An explanation for this finding in a 
world of statistical discrimination could be the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ concept 
(Farmer and Terrell, 1996). If a firm expects women to be less productive (or more 
absent) than men, it will spent less resources to train female workers and, consequently, 
women will be less productive than men in the long-run.
7 The early career disadvantage 
should be persistent and lead to an increasing GWG, because the career opportunities 
for women are worse than for their male colleagues. This might also explain why 
female blue-collar workers are stuck to lower hierarchical levels as shown in the 
descriptive analysis in Section 3.2 (for a discussion of lower promotion probabilities of 
females see Pfeifer, 2007). 
The different developments of the GWGs among blue-collar and white-collar workers 
fit both into theories of statistical discrimination. As the explanations are somewhat 
different – employer learning vs. investments in human capital – and we analyse the 
workforce of a single company, it needs to be discussed why the firm treats blue-collar 
and white-collar workers differently. Considering employer learning, the firm might 
even find it easier to observe the productivity in production work (blue-collar) than in 
administration work (white-collar). Thus, we think it is more likely that investments in 
human capital in the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ concept can explain the differences. 
Administration work typically requires more general than firm-specific qualifications, 
                                                 
7 Consistent with this, Fahr and Sunde (2008) report evidence for Germany that women are less likely 
than men to participate in formal training after finishing apprenticeship. 16 
 
whereas it is the opposite way around in production work.
8 The type of skills has 
implications for cost coverage of training (Becker, 1975) and, consequently, on training 
decisions. The firm is more likely to invest in specific skills of workers, who have a 
higher expected productivity, who are likely to provide more working hours, and who 
are likely to have higher employment stability. Therefore, the firm will rather invest in 
male than female blue-collar workers. Female white-collar workers, however, can 
largely decide on their own if they invest in human capital because skills are mostly 
general and, consequently, the firm will not cover the training costs anyway. 
Another explanation might be related to differences in absenteeism, because the gender 
gap in absenteeism follows the same trend as the evolution of the GWG. As we will 
show in Section 4.5, the evolution of the gender gap in absent working hours differs 
between blue-collar and white-collar workers. Whereas the gender gap in absenteeism 
increases with age for blue-collar workers, the gender gap decreases with age for white-
collar workers. A reason might be that physical fitness is more important in production 
than in administration work and female physical fitness is more sensitive to ageing than 
male physical fitness. 
 
4.4  Wage Effect of Individual Absenteeism 
Individual absenteeism should affect negatively individual wages for several reasons. 
Not only quasi-fixed labour costs like adjustment costs and investments in human 
capital are explanations for a wage penalty for workers who are more absent, but also 
wage costs. If firms have to cover the costs of wage replacement for absent (sick) 
workers as in Germany, firms will pay workers, who are more likely to be absent, lower 
average wages because they supply less effective working hours. In addition to a 
negative wage effect of absenteeism, the inclusion of control variables for individual 
absenteeism might reduce the GWG because absenteeism might have been an omitted 
variable in the previous estimates. 
                                                 
8 Note that the analyzed firm is very specialized and has also a unique production technology. 17 
 
Several specifications of the earnings functions are estimated for blue-collar workers 
(see Table 14) and white-collar workers (see Table 15).
9 In the upper part (see panel A) 
of Tables 14 and 15, the estimates for the total sample are repeated and an additional 
explanatory variable measuring the individual number of absent working hours in a 
given month is included. Contradicting our hypothesis of a negative impact, 
absenteeism is positively correlated with the hourly wage and has a stronger impact for 
white-collar than for blue-collar workers. However, the coefficients are small and not 
significant for blue-collar workers. Overall, the inclusion of absenteeism does not 
change the GWG. To check this result, several robustness checks are performed.      
-  Insert Table 14 about here 
-  Insert Table 15 about here 
An endogeneity problem might exist, because workers might not earn less or more 
because they are more absent, but workers react with more absenteeism to lower or 
higher wages (adjustment to the equilibrium in the leisure-consumption framework of 
labour supply, income and substitution effects). Therefore, our first robustness check is 
an IV (instrumental variable) estimator (see last estimate in panel A). For this purpose, 
an instrument was constructed which is highly correlated with the individual number of 
absent working hours in a given month but not with the individual wage. The mean 
number of absent working hours in a given month fulfils this condition, since it 
measures an exogenous shock to absenteeism (e.g., cold, flu) but not to wages. The 
wage effect of absenteeism in the IV estimates is positive and weakly significant for 
blue-collar workers, whereas it is negative and highly significant for white-collar 
workers. 
The next robustness check is concerned with the measurement of absenteeism. As it is 
plausible that wages are not adjusted every month for actual absenteeism, the firm 
might use longer measurement (learning) periods. Thus, we use a sample of workers 
with at least 24 months observed employment history and different measurement spells 
(sum in one month, one year, and two years) for absenteeism as explanatory variables 
                                                 
9 Tables 14 and 15 report only coefficients for female dummies and absenteeism measures. Complete 
estimation results can be requested from the corresponding author. 18 
 
(see panel B). None of these absenteeism variables is significant and no impact on the 
GWG can be detected. In the next step, we use only observations from December 2005 
(see panel C) and as an additional measurement of absenteeism the mean monthly 
number of absent working hours in the total observed employment history. This long 
term measure, which uses all available information on absenteeism, finally shows the 
expected impact. Workers with on average more absent working hours earn 
significantly lower wages and the GWG is reduced by 0.33 percentage points for blue-
collar workers and 0.67 percentage points for white-collar workers.   
Overall, we find no conclusive evidence that individual absenteeism has a strong 
negative wage effect and that its inclusion in the earnings functions explains a larger 
part of the GWG. Corcoran and Duncan (1979) and Duncan and Corcoran (1984) also 
find that individual absenteeism explains almost none of the GWG although differences 
in mean absent working hours between men and women are large. Osterman (1979) 
reports evidence that average absenteeism in previous years has a negative effect on 
wages of females but that the impact on the GWG is limited. Malkiel and Malkiel 
(1979) also find a negative correlation between average absenteeism and annual income, 
which is only significant for females.                
 
4.5  Gender Differences in Absenteeism 
In this section, we use random effects GLS estimates for the number of absent working 
hours per month to determine the gender gap in absenteeism. Table 16 informs about 
the results. The first estimates include only the female dummy and month dummies. 
Female blue-collar (white-collar) workers are on average 2.1 (0.8) hours more absent 
than male blue-collar (white-collar) workers, which concludes in a gender gap in 
absenteeism of 31 (26) percent. After including control variables for tenure, entry age, 
schooling, and working hours, the gender gap in absenteeism increases to 2.2 hours (32 
percent) for blue-collar workers and 1.5 hours (46 percent) for white-collar workers.
10 
The estimated gender gap in absenteeism in our personnel data falls into the range of 
                                                 
10 Ichino and Moretti (2006) also find for four different data sets that the gender gap in absenteeism 
increases after control variables are included in the estimates. 19 
 
estimates in previous studies (e.g., Ichino and Moretti, 2006). As Ichino and Moretti 
(2006) point out, females are exposed to an additional health shock in absenteeism, 
namely the menstrual cycle. Therefore, independent of differences in worker 
characteristics, a sizable gender gap in absenteeism remains which is partly determined 
by biological gender differences. Other sources of higher female absenteeism might 
stem from family responsibilities (e.g., care for sick children). 
-  Insert Table 16 about here 
Ichino and Moretti (2006) point out that the menstrual cycle effect should disappear 
after the age of 45 years and report convincing evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
Thus, we also look at the evolution of the gender gap in absent working hours. As we 
are now interested in the age effect, we replace the tenure and entry age variables with 
age variables in the following estimates. Moreover, interaction terms between the 
female dummy and age, squared age, and cubed age are incorporated. Table 17 contains 
the results. To ease interpretation, the evolution of the gender gap in absent working 
hours for blue-collar and white-collar workers is depicted in Figure 15. Female blue-
collar (white-collar) workers are about 1.4 (1.7) days more absent than male blue-collar 
(white-collar) workers at the age of 25. The gender gap increases with age for blue-
collar workers to more than three absent working hours after the age of 50. For white-
collar workers the gender gap is relatively constant until the age of 45, but decreasing 
afterwards. The latter finding is line with Ichino and Moretti (2006) who analysed 
white-collar workers and the menstrual cycle effect. An explanation for the steadily 
increasing gender gap for blue-collar workers might be that physical fitness is more 
important in production than in administration work and female physical fitness is more 
sensitive to ageing than male physical fitness. The differences in the gender gap in 
absenteeism between blue-collar and white-collar workers might also partly explain the 
different evolutions of the GWGs (see Section 4.3). 
-  Insert Table 17 about here 
-  Insert Figure 15 about here 
As shown in the previous section, individual absenteeism has only a small impact on the 
GWG. Therefore, it seems not to be straightforward to interpret the costs associated 20 
 
with individual absenteeism as the major determinant of the observed GWG. However, 
combining the cost approach with statistical discrimination might explain the 
persistence of the GWG. Recalling the findings, the gender gap in absenteeism is 
between 26 and 46 percent and larger than the GWGs of about 13 percent estimated in 
the previous sections. These findings are the basis for the subsequent theoretical model 
and discussion. 
 
5.  A Simple Model and Discussion 
5.1  The Basic Model with Absenteeism and Homogenous Workers 
The subsequent model combines wage costs due to absenteeism and statistical 
discrimination when determining female and male wages to explain the GWG.
11 We use 
three scenarios in which a firm maximizes profits under perfect competition. The first 
scenario (A) comprises no wage replacement for absent workers, i.e., the firm pays the 
market wage only for effective working hours (contractual working hours minus absent 
working hours). In the second scenario (B), absent workers receive 100 percent wage 
replacement and the firm cannot adjust the market wage, i.e., the firm pays the market 
wage for contractual working hours regardless of absent working hours. The third 
scenario (C) also comprises 100 percent wage replacement. In this scenario, however, 
the firm can adjust the market wage according to absent working hours, i.e., the firm 
pays an adjusted wage for contractual working hours.   
At first, we analyse a simple setting of homogeneous workers. Scenario A (no wage 
replacement) can be described as follows. The competitive firm maximizes its profits 
(∏) in (2) if the difference between the value of total output (pQ) and costs is 
maximised. We assume market output prices (p), a fixed production technology (Q), 
constant capital (K), market capital prices (r), and market wages (w). Moreover, total 
labour consists of the number of workers (N) times the effective working hours, which 
                                                 
11 The model developed in Ichino and Moretti (2006) is quite different from ours, because their “key 
insight is that absenteeism is a noisier signal of shirking attitudes for females than males” (Ichino and 
Moretti, 2006, p. 17).  21 
 
are contractual working hours (HC) minus absent working hours (HA≤ H C). As all 
workers are homogenous, all workers provide the same number of working hours. 
Furthermore, absent working hours are exogenously chosen by workers. Thus, the 
firm’s only choice variable is the number of hired workers, which is similar to the 
standard textbook model of the profit-maximizing firm in the short run. The first order 
condition (FOC) in (3) yields the standard result that a firm hires workers up to the 
point in which wage costs per worker equals the value of marginal product. If workers 
are more absent, the firm simply hires more workers. 
(2)  () ( )
N max   , CA CA pQH HN K w H HNr K Π= − − − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  








In scenario B (100 percent wage replacement without wage adjustment), the profit 
function and FOC slightly change. As the firm has to pay the market wage regardless of 
absent working hours, absent working hours are dropped from labour costs in the profit 
function in (4) and are not part of the LHS of the FOC in (5). Compared with scenario 
A, wage replacement in scenario B implies less employment because the firm has not to 
pay for effective but for contractual working hours. 
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Scenario C comprises 100 percent wage replacement and wage adjustment. The firm 
adjusts market wages according to absenteeism so that total labour costs equal total 
labour costs as if there is no wage replacement (scenario A). The effective wage for 
contractual working hours is denoted with wE and calculated as follows in (6) and (7). 














The new profit function and FOC in (8) and (9) show that the firm hires the same 
number of workers in scenario C as in scenario A, if wages can be adjusted according to 
absenteeism – even in case of a 100 percent wage replacement. 
(8)  ()










5.2  Introducing Heterogeneous Groups, Statistical Discrimination, and 
Employer Learning 
The model with homogenous workers is very basic and intuitive. Let us now assume 
that workers are heterogeneous with respect to absenteeism, but have the same number 
of contractual working hours and are equally productive. Moreover, we assume that the 
firm has no information about future individual absenteeism. However, the firm has 
information on average absent working hours among two groups – females (F) and 
males (M). These group averages are used to form expectations about individual 
absenteeism of workers (statistical discrimination). Expected absenteeism of a newly 
hired female is  [ ] AF EH  and expected absenteeism of a newly hired male is  [ ] AM EH . 
From the previous empirical analysis, we know (like the firm) that females are on 
average more hours absent than males ( [ ] [ ] AF AM EH EH > ). 
In scenario A (no wage replacement), such statistical discrimination has no impact on 
wages at first. As the firm has only to pay for effective working hours, the firm is 
indifferent between hiring females and males. However, the firm would have to hire 
more females. In case of quasi-fixed employment costs, this leads to the conclusion that 
the firm prefers to hire males. Consequently, females might reduce their reservation 
wages in the long run and a GWG might arise. Scenario B (100 percent wage 
replacement without wage adjustment) implies also no impact on wages at first, because 
the firm prefers to hire males with lower expected absenteeism and associated wage 23 
 
costs than females.
12 Like in scenario A, females might reduce their reservation wages 
and a GWG might arise.  
The most interesting scenario is scenario C with 100 percent wage replacement and the 
possibility to adjust wages according to expected absenteeism. In such a setting, the 
firm is also willing to hire females. However, the firm only hires females with higher 
expected absenteeism than males if female wages are adjusted downwards. 
Consequently, a GWG arises. Recall the definition of the effective wage after wage 
adjustment in (10). We can also define the effective wage for females and males, from 
which the female-male wage ratio can be calculated in (11). To simplify notification and 
to allow for differences in working hours, we introduce the expected absenteeism rate 










































The first derivate of the female-male wage ratio with respect to the expected female 
absenteeism rate in (12) is negative, i.e., if, ceteris paribus, female absenteeism 
increases, female wages and, consequently, the female-male wage ratio decreases. It can 
be seen that the female-male wage ratio reacts more strongly to a change in female 
absenteeism if male absenteeism is high. The rationale is that the wage cost argument 
gains in importance for higher absenteeism rates, for which expected male absenteeism 
is the reference point. 
                                                 
12 Renes and Ridder (1995) and Sattinger (1998) show analogously that profit-maximizing firms set 
higher hiring standards and interview fewer workers from a group which has a higher average quit rate, 


















Figure 16 illustrates this finding graphically for two cases. In the first case, men are not 
absent at all ( [ ] 0 M EA = ) and, therefore, the slope is minus one. The second case 
depicts the general case in which expected male absenteeism rates are larger zero 
( [ ] 0 M EA > ). The axis intercept is larger one and the slope is steeper than in the first 
case. If  [ ] [ ] FM EA EA > , female wages are lower than male wages.  
-  Insert Figure 16 about here 
We use a simple example from our descriptive statistics (see Section 3) to demonstrate 
the quantitative dimension of absenteeism on the female-male wage ratio in our 
analysed company. Table 18 displays the means of absenteeism and contractual 
working hours for females and males, from which the female-male wage ratio is 
calculated according to (11). In a world without any other forms of discrimination and 
under the assumption of equal productivity of the genders, the female-male wage ratios 
are 98.3 percent for blue-collar workers and 99.17 percent for white-collar workers. 
Thus, the GWG should be relatively small between women and men based on 
differences in absenteeism rates.
13 This is because the overall absenteeism rates are 
small, though differences between men and women are large. Nevertheless, statistical 
discrimination seems to have a not negligible impact on the GWG because we only 
account for statistical discrimination on one factor, namely wage costs due to 
absenteeism. There are, however, other factors (e.g., quasi-fixed employment costs, quit 
rates) which are correlated with employment costs and from which statistical 
discrimination is likely to occur (Renes and Ridder, 1995; Sattinger, 1998). All these 
factors might add up to a sizeable GWG explained by statistical discrimination. 
-  Insert Table 18 about here 
                                                 
13 Allen (1983, pp. 391-392) also reports empirical evidence that the differences in average absence rates 
between men and women should account only for a small fraction of the GWG. 25 
 
If the firm learns about individual absenteeism, statistical discrimination based on 
average absenteeism in the gender groups might get less important when setting wages. 
In scenario A, however, employer learning has no impact on the GWG because absent 
working hours are not paid. In scenario B (100 percent wage replacement without wage 
adjustment), employer learning has also no impact on wages because the firm hires no 
females. Even if females reduce their reservation wages to get hired, learning has no 
impact on the GWG because the GWG is induced by differences in reservation wages. 
In scenario C (100 percent wage replacement with wage adjustment), the firm statistical 
discriminates females when they enter the firm so that they receive lower wages than 
males, whose absenteeism rates are on average lower. After learning about individual 
absenteeism, the firm could adjust wages according to expected future individual 
absenteeism. However, females with more absenteeism than males still receive lower 
wages. Since wage setting is a complex and sensitive process, the firm might prefer to 
stay with the initial wage differential so that the impact of individual absenteeism on 
wages is limited. 
 
5.3  Implications 
The results of the theoretical model, which is based on our empirical findings, have 
implications for the wage structure. If the GWG is partly determined by the cost 
argument of higher absenteeism rates of females, this part of the wage differential 
between men and women will be persistent over time. Moreover, statistical 
discrimination by the firm leads to redistribution of wages. Women with lower than 
average female absenteeism are underpaid relatively to their individual effective 
working hours, whereas women with higher than average female absenteeism are 
overpaid. Thus, females with low absenteeism subsidise females with high absenteeism. 
If the gender gap in wages does not completely account for the gender gap in 
absenteeism, a second redistribution from males to females exists. Winner of these 
redistribution processes are especially women with high absenteeism. Statistical 
discrimination, however, makes also men with higher than average male absenteeism to 26 
 
winners because they are paid higher wages than in a world in which every worker is 
paid according to his effective number of working hours.       
In the setting of our model, policy interventions to reduce the GWG are market 
interventions. Note that the wage differentials between men and women are no market 
failure and that statistical discrimination might be efficient (Schwab, 1986; Norman, 
2003). Nevertheless, policy interventions can be justified on equity instead of efficiency 
grounds (Cain, 1985). First, policy can implement equal pay laws, which in the 
framework of our model are not the same as anti discrimination laws. Such an equal pay 
intervention would advise the firm to pay male and female workers the same wage for a 
given number of contractual working hours regardless of absenteeism, i.e., the firm is 
not allowed to statistical discriminate females in making wage adjustments. Because 
this results into higher wage costs for effective working hours of women, the firm will 
hire no or fewer women and the hired female workers might be a positive selection 
(e.g., women need a higher productivity than men to equalize the higher absent working 
hours). Second, policy can subsidize female wages to reduce the GWG in paid hourly 
wages (Cain, 1985). This need not to be done explicitly but can also be done implicitly 
by different taxation of men and women. A third policy could directly aim at 
absenteeism of females. For example, special health care policy for women might 
reduce the gender gap in absenteeism. Fourth, nursery schools in Germany often suffer 
from inflexible opening hours and long closing periods during school holidays. More 
financial and personnel support for childcare facilities could improve the situation for 
mothers. Fifth, working time flexibility as well as possibilities to work from home (e.g., 
telework) could help to combine market work with family responsibilities.  
Even though we discussed our results in the light of statistical discrimination and find 
them largely consistent with it, we cannot rule out other explanations of the GWG like 
taste or societal discrimination (e.g., education, family responsibilities). Therefore, the 
findings should not be interpreted as a ‘magic bullet’ which explains – or even excuses 
– all disadvantages of women in the labour market. Furthermore, it should be kept in 
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics blue-collar workers 
 obs  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
hourly gross wage (Euros)  50722  14.9392  1.9362  8.8765  33.5824 
log  wage  50722 2.6957 0.1286 2.1834 3.5140 
absent working hours  50722  7.1422  19.2652  0.0000  152.0000 
female  (dummy)  50722 0.1898 0.3922 0.0000 1.0000 
tenure  (years)  50722 15.0591 9.1817  0.0658 49.1096 
tenure squared / 100  50722  3.1108  3.2535  0.0000  24.1175 
tenure cubed / 1000  50722  7.5076  11.5804  0.0000  118.4401 
entry age (years)  50722  27.1737  7.4866  13.7041  55.5315 
entry age squared / 100  50722  7.9446  4.6050  1.8780  30.8375 
age  (years)  50722 42.2328 8.6482 19.1973  65.0767 
age squared / 100  50722  18.5840  7.3360  3.6853  42.3498 
age cubed / 1000  50722  84.7773  49.0392  7.0749  275.5985 
apprenticeship  degree  (dummy)  50722 0.7231 0.4475 0.0000 1.0000 
monthly working hours  50722  150.7820  6.7302  43.5000  174.0000 
monthly working hours squared / 100  50722  227.8050  17.3817  18.9225  302.7600 
level  1  (dummy)  50722 0.0874 0.2824 0.0000 1.0000 
level  2  (dummy)  50722 0.0638 0.2445 0.0000 1.0000 
level  3  (dummy)  50722 0.0997 0.2996 0.0000 1.0000 
level  4  (dummy)  50722 0.4055 0.4910 0.0000 1.0000 
level  5  (dummy)  50722 0.1869 0.3899 0.0000 1.0000 
level  6  (dummy)  50722 0.1114 0.3147 0.0000 1.0000 




Table A.2: Descriptive statistics white-collar workers 
 obs  mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
hourly gross wage (Euros)  73174  23.4121  6.8717  8.7356  83.3333 
log  wage  73174 3.1153 0.2710 2.1674 4.4228 
absent working hours  73174  3.4159  12.9307  0.0000  168.0000 
female  (dummy)  73174 0.2751 0.4466 0.0000 1.0000 
tenure  (years)  73174 13.8197 9.5887  0.0055 48.2000 
tenure squared / 100  73174  2.8293  3.2501  0.0000  23.2324 
tenure cubed / 1000  73174  6.8592  11.2046  0.0000  111.9802 
entry age (years)  73174  28.3615  7.3982  13.7041  62.2575 
entry age squared / 100  73174  8.5911  4.6121  1.8780  38.7600 
age  (years)  73174 42.1812 9.4360 18.6603  65.9753 
age squared / 100  73174  18.6829  8.0275  3.4821  43.5275 
age cubed / 1000  73174  86.3187  53.9495  6.4976  287.1739 
low school degree (dummy)  73174  0.4847  0.4998  0.0000  1.0000 
high  school  degree  (dummy)  73174 0.1632 0.3696 0.0000 1.0000 
university  degree  (dummy)  73174 0.3521 0.4776 0.0000 1.0000 
monthly working hours  73174  151.6139  19.5006  17.3200  174.3000 
monthly working hours squared / 100  73174  233.6703  50.5451  2.9998  303.8049 
level  1  (dummy)  73174 0.1029 0.3038 0.0000 1.0000 
level  2  (dummy)  73174 0.2351 0.4241 0.0000 1.0000 
level  3  (dummy)  73174 0.2543 0.4355 0.0000 1.0000 
level  4  (dummy)  73174 0.1480 0.3551 0.0000 1.0000 
level  5  (dummy)  73174 0.1122 0.3156 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 1: Level descriptions from collective contract 
level blue-collar  workers  white-collar  workers 
1  unskilled work (instruction)   simple tasks (instruction or basic training)  
2  semi-skilled work  (basic training)   somewhat difficult tasks  (three-year 
apprenticeship)  
3  semi-skilled work  (two-year 
apprenticeship)  
moderately difficult tasks (university of 
applied science degree)  
4  somewhat difficult skilled work  
(three-year apprenticeship)  
difficult tasks, making decisions of limited 
scope (university degree)  
5  moderately difficult skilled work 
(three-year apprenticeship)  
very difficult tasks, making decisions of 
broader scope (university degree)  
6  difficult skilled work (three-year 
apprenticeship)  
upper management tasks, non-pay-scale (not 
subject to collective contract)  







Table 2: Division in levels for blue-collar workers 
level statistics  total  male  female 
1  number  of  obs.  4431 0 4431 
 share  in  row  100  0  100 
  share in column  8.74  0  46.02 
       
2 number  of  obs.  3238  635  2603 
 share  in  row  100  19.61  80.39 
  share in column  6.38  1.55  27.04 
       
3  number  of  obs.  5056 3450 1606 
 share  in  row  100  68.24  31.76 
  share in column  9.97  8.4  16.68 
       
4 number  of  obs.  20569  19749  820 
 share  in  row  100  96.01  3.99 
  share in column  40.55  48.06  8.52 
       
5 number  of  obs.  9482  9314  168 
 share  in  row  100  98.23  1.77 
  share in column  18.69  22.67  1.74 
       
6 number  of  obs.  5652  5652  0 
 share  in  row  100  100  0 
  share in column  11.14  13.75  0 
       
7 number  of  obs.  2294  2294  0 
 share  in  row  100  100  0 
  share in column  4.52  5.58  0 
total number  of  obs.  50722  41094  9628 
 share  in  row  100  81.02  18.98 
  share in column  100  100  100 
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Table 3: Division in levels for white-collar workers 
level statistics total  male  female 
1  number  of  obs.  7527 2619 4908 
 share  in  row  100  34.79  65.21 
  share in column  10.29  4.94  24.38 
       
2 number  of  obs.  17205  10242  6963 
 share  in  row  100  59.53  40.47 
  share in column  23.51  19.31  34.59 
       
3 number  of  obs.  18606  13641  4965 
 share  in  row  100  73.32  26.68 
  share in column  25.43  25.72  24.67 
       
4 number  of  obs.  10828  9093  1735 
 share  in  row  100  83.98  16.02 
  share in column  14.8  17.14  8.62 
       
5 number  of  obs.  8211  7465  746 
 share  in  row  100  90.91  9.09 
  share in column  11.22  14.07  3.71 
       
6 number  of  obs.  10797  9985  812 
 share  in  row  100  92.48  7.52 
  share in column  14.76  18.82  4.03 
total  number  of  obs.  73174 53045 20129 
 share  in  row  100  72.49  27.51 
  share in column  100  100  100 
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Table 4: Composition of the workforce and gender differences 
 (A)  blue-collar  workers 
 total  male  female  M-F 
tenure in years  15.0591  15.2288  14.3348  0.8940 
entry age in years  27.1737  26.8965  28.3568  -1.4603 
apprenticeship dummy  0.7231  0.7777  0.4901  0.2876 
contractual working hours  150.7820  151.5719  147.4104  4.1615 
number of observations  50722  41094  9628   
        
 (B)  white-collar  workers 
 total  male  female  M-F 
tenure in years  13.8197  14.3583  12.4003  1.9580 
entry age in years  28.3615  29.0581  26.5259  2.5322 
low school degree dummy  0.4847  0.4909  0.4682  0.0227 
high school degree dummy  0.1632  0.1090  0.3062  -0.1972 
university degree dummy  0.3521  0.4001  0.2255  0.1745 
contractual working hours  151.6139  156.7344  138.1199  18.6145 
number of observations  73174  53045  20129   




Table 5: Mean wages and gender differences 
 (A)  blue-collar  workers 
 obs  mean  std.  err.  std.  dev. 
male 41094  15.3500  0.0090  1.8284 
female 9628  13.1860  0.0132  1.2993 
combined 50722  14.9392  0.0086  1.9362 
difference  2.1640  0.0197   
        
 (B)  white-collar  workers 
 obs  mean  std.  err.  std.  dev. 
male 53045  24.8737  0.0305  7.0297 
female 20129  19.5605  0.0323  4.5790 
combined 73174  23.4121  0.0254  6.8717 
difference  5.3133  0.0534   
Note: Mean gross hourly wages in Euros. Gender differences are 



























Figure 8: Relative magnitude of wage costs due to absenteeism 
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Table 6: Mean absenteeism and gender differences 
 (A)  blue-collar  workers 
 obs  mean  std.  err.  std.  dev. 
male 41094  6.7253  0.0930  18.8515 
female 9628  8.9216  0.2125  20.8466 
combined 50722 7.1422  0.0855  19.2652 
difference   -2.1963  0.2179   
        
 (B)  white-collar  workers 
 obs  mean  std.  err.  std.  dev. 
male 53045  3.2186  0.0554  12.7700 
female 20129  3.9358  0.0940  13.3312 
combined 73174 3.4159  0.0478  12.9307 
difference   -0.7172  0.1070   
Note: Mean absent working hours per month. Gender differences are 










Figure 10: Mean absent working hours of male and female white-collar workers 49 
 
Table 7: Estimates of the gender wag gap for blue-collar workers  
 blue-collar  workers 
female  (dummy)  -0.1471*** -0.1288*** -0.0353*** 
  [0.0073] [0.0073] [0.0058] 
tenure (years)    0.0155***  0.0101*** 
   [0.0004]  [0.0003] 
tenure squared / 100    -0.0528***  -0.0452*** 
   [0.0014]  [0.0012] 
tenure cubed / 1000    0.0058***  0.0058*** 
   [0.0002]  [0.0002] 
entry age (years)    -0.0073***  -0.0037** 
   [0.0020]  [0.0015] 
entry age squared / 100    0.0114***  0.0060*** 
   [0.0031]  [0.0023] 
apprenticeship degree (dummy)    0.0602***  0.0147*** 
   [0.0068]  [0.0049] 
monthly working hours    0.0013***  0.0013*** 
   [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
monthly working hours squared / 100    -0.0006***  -0.0007*** 
   [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
level 2 (dummy)      0.0206*** 
     [0.0013] 
level 3 (dummy)      0.0359*** 
     [0.0024] 
level 4 (dummy)      0.0815*** 
     [0.0027] 
level 5 (dummy)      0.1849*** 
     [0.0032] 
level 6 (dummy)      0.2394*** 
     [0.0037] 
level 7 (dummy)      0.3043*** 
     [0.0043] 
month  yes yes yes 
constant  2.5882*** 2.5169*** 2.4182*** 
  [0.0042] [0.0354] [0.0265] 
observations  50722 50722 50722 
individuals  786 786 786 
R-squared (overall)  0.3810 0.4907 0.7458 
Note: Random effects GLS estimates for log hourly wage. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 50 
 
Table 8: Estimates of the gender wag gap for white-collar workers  
 white-collar  workers 
female  (dummy)  -0.2592*** -0.1306*** -0.0819*** 
  [0.0142] [0.0102] [0.0064] 
tenure (years)    0.0396***  0.0290*** 
   [0.0005]  [0.0004] 
tenure squared / 100    -0.1269***  -0.0944*** 
   [0.0020]  [0.0017] 
tenure cubed / 1000    0.0128***  0.0096*** 
   [0.0003]  [0.0003] 
entry age (years)    0.0378***  0.0120*** 
   [0.0029]  [0.0013] 
entry age squared / 100    -0.0278***  -0.0006 
   [0.0041]  [0.0019] 
high school degree (dummy)    0.0283**  0.0126 
   [0.0141]  [0.0089] 
university degree (dummy)    0.1971***  0.1141*** 
   [0.0108]  [0.0068] 
monthly working hours    0.0002  0.0010*** 
   [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
monthly working hours squared / 100    0.0000  -0.0004*** 
   [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
level 2 (dummy)      0.0977*** 
     [0.0017] 
level 3 (dummy)      0.1769*** 
     [0.0023] 
level 4 (dummy)      0.2521*** 
     [0.0028] 
level 5 (dummy)      0.3183*** 
     [0.0032] 
level 6 (dummy)      0.3800*** 
     [0.0038] 
month  yes yes yes 
constant  3.0066*** 1.8118*** 2.2082*** 
  [0.0084] [0.0486] [0.0238] 
observations  73174 73174 73174 
individuals  1250 1250 1250 
R-squared  (overall)  0.1769 0.4351 0.7451 
Note: See Table 7. 
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Table 9: Estimates by gender for blue-collar workers 
   decomposition 
  men  women  explained  as %  unexplained  as % 
tenure (years)  0.0165*** 0.0112*** 0.0100***  1.5  0.0805*** 7.6 
  [0.0005] [0.0010] [0.0014]   [0.01607]  
tenure squared / 100  -0.0524*** -0.0673*** -0.0338***  -2.6 0.0476***  4.0 
  [0.0015] [0.0041] [0.0029]  [0.0142]   
tenure cubed / 1000  0.0054*** 0.0113*** 0.0252***  1.2  -0.0466***  -3.4 
  [0.0002] [0.0008] [0.0021]  [0.0069]   
entry age (years)  -0.0076*** -0.0031  0.0045 1.1 -0.1225 -12.9 
  [0.0024] [0.0033] [0.0048]  [0.1097]   
entry age squared / 100  0.0113*** 0.0042  -0.0034  -0.9  0.0554 6.1 
  [0.0038] [0.0050] [0.0041]  [0.0490]   
apprenticeship (dummy)  0.0728*** 0.011  0.0032  2.1  0.0481***  3.0 
  [0.0079] [0.0118] [0.0034]  [0.0111]   
monthly working hours  0.0010*** 0.0015*** 0.0061***  0.4  -0.0709  -6.9 
  [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0007]  [0.0446]   
monthly working hours squared / 100  -0.0005*** -0.0008*** -0.0086***  -0.5 0.0671**  6.4 
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0009]  [0.0286]   
month  yes yes        
constant  2.5090*** 2.4060***         
  [0.0426] [0.0543]         
observations  41094 9628         
individuals  632 154        
R-squared (overall)  0.3853 0.3102         






Table 10: Estimates by gender for white-collar workers 
   decomposition 
  men  women  explained  as %  unexplained  as % 
tenure (years)  0.0411*** 0.0356*** 0.0696***  8.0  0.0792*** 6.8 
  [0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0033]  [0.0164]   
tenure squared / 100  -0.1281*** -0.1252*** -0.0752***  -7.7  -0.0088  -0.7 
  [0.0022] [0.0046] [0.0041]  [0.0152]   
tenure cubed / 1000  0.0129*** 0.0132*** 0.0254***  2.5  -0.0025  -0.2 
  [0.0004] [0.0008] [0.0019]  [0.0068]   
entry age (years)  0.0450*** 0.0201*** 0.0510***  11.4  0.7226*** 66.0 
  [0.0022] [0.0047] [0.0120]  [0.1504]   
entry age squared / 100  -0.0345*** -0.0126*  -0.0180*  -4.9  -0.1972***  -16.6 
  [0.0029] [0.0069] [0.0099]  [0.0669]   
high school (dummy)  0.0113 0.0342*  -0.0067*  -0.2  -0.0025  -0.7 
  [0.0191] [0.0186] [0.0037]  [0.0029]   
university (dummy)  0.1869*** 0.2280*** 0.0398***  3.3 -0.0164*  -0.9 
  [0.0117] [0.0207] [0.0037]  [0.0095]   
monthly working hours  0.0030*** 0.0000  0.0007  5.6  0.4624***  40.8 
  [0.0006] [0.0001] [0.0024]  [0.0887]   
monthly working hours squared / 100  -0.0009*** 0.0001  0.0042  -4.1  -0.2314***  -18.6 
  [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0028]  [0.0480]   
month  yes yes        
constant  1.4383*** 2.0606***         
  [0.0579] [0.0735]         
observations  53045 20129         
individuals  887 363        
R-squared (overall)  0.373 0.3222         
Note: See Table 7.   
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Table 11: Estimates by gender for white-collar workers with hierarchical levels 
   decomposition 
  men  women  explained  as %  unexplained  as % 
tenure (years)  0.0299*** 0.0270*** 0.0528***  5.9 0.0430***  3.7 
  [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0024]   [0.0115]   
tenure squared / 100  -0.0957*** -0.0946*** -0.0568***  -5.7  -0.0032  -0.3 
  [0.0019] [0.0037] [0.0032]   [0.0125]   
tenure cubed / 1000  0.0096*** 0.0105*** 0.0202***  1.8  -0.0066  -0.5 
  [0.0003] [0.0007] [0.0016]   [0.0056]   
entry age (years)  0.0161*** 0.0041** 0.0104**  4.1 0.3484***  31.8 
  [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0046]   [0.0726]   
entry age squared / 100  -0.0037 0.0032 0.0046  -0.5  -0.0627**  -5.3 
  [0.0023] [0.0027] [0.0038]   [0.0318]   
high school (dummy)  0.0059 0.0081  -0.0016  -0.1  -0.0002  -0.1 
  [0.0137] [0.0081] [0.0016]   [0.0017]   
university (dummy)  0.1114*** 0.1170*** 0.0204***  1.9  -0.0022  -0.1 
  [0.0084] [0.0098] [0.0018]   [0.0051]   
monthly working hours  0.0043*** 0.0003*** 0.0063***  8.0 0.6204*** 54.7 
  [0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0021]   [0.0665]   
monthly working hours squared / 100  -0.0016*** -0.0001*** -0.0071***  -7.5 -0.3469*** -27.9
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0025]   [0.0369]   
level 2 (dummy)  0.1041*** 0.0898***  -0.0137***  -1.6 0.0028***  0.5 
  [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0005]   [0.0006]   
level 3 (dummy)  0.1790*** 0.1777*** 0.0019***  0.2  0.0003  0.0 
  [0.0030] [0.0036] [0.0006]   [0.0012]   
level 4 (dummy)  0.2506*** 0.2710*** 0.0231***  2.1 -0.0035*** -0.2 
  [0.0033] [0.0055] [0.0008]   [0.0011]   
level 5 (dummy)  0.3115*** 0.3682*** 0.0382***  3.2 -0.0080*** -0.2 
  [0.0037] [0.0066] [0.0010]   [0.0011]   
level 6 (dummy)  0.3855*** 0.3816*** 0.0564***  5.7  0.0007  0.0 
  [0.0043] [0.0081] [0.0015]   [0.0017]   
month  yes yes       
constant  1.8717*** 2.3580***         
  [0.0431] [0.0288]         
observations  53045 20129         
individuals  887 363        
R-squared (overall)  0.6878 0.7807         
Note: See Table 7. 54 
 







with hierarchical levels 
raw differential (R)   15.0  25.3  24.4 
explained differential (E)   1.9  13.8  17.5 
unexplained differential (U)  13.1  11.6  6.9 
explained as % total (E/R):  12.9  54.3  71.7 












Figure 12: Predicted wage-tenure profile for male and female white collar workers 
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Table 13: Gender wage gap and tenure 
  without control for levels  with control for levels 
 blue-collar  white-collar  blue-collar  white-collar 
female (dummy)  -0.0714***  -0.1492***  0.0117  -0.0942*** 
 [0.0089]  [0.0111]  [0.0081]  [0.0071] 
interaction female * tenure  -0.0041***  0.0013  -0.0033***  0.0009 
 [0.0007]  [0.0008]  [0.0006]  [0.0007] 
interaction female * squared tenure  -0.0144***  0.0005  -0.0076**  -0.0014 
 [0.0042]  [0.0051]  [0.0038]  [0.0042] 
interaction female * cubed tenure  0.0057***  0.0007  0.0033***  0.0012 
 [0.0008]  [0.0009]  [0.0008]  [0.0008] 
tenure (years)  0.0164***  0.0393***  0.0107***  0.0289*** 
 [0.0004]  [0.0006]  [0.0003]  [0.0004] 
tenure squared / 100  -0.0523***  -0.1276***  -0.0446***  -0.0950*** 
 [0.0015]  [0.0022]  [0.0013]  [0.0019] 
tenure cubed / 1000  0.0054***  0.0128***  0.0054***  0.0096*** 
 [0.0002]  [0.0004]  [0.0002]  [0.0003] 
controlled for levels  No  No  Yes  Yes 
observations  50722 73174  50722  73174 
individuals  786 1250  786  1250 
R-squared (overall)  0.4978 0.4331  0.7453  0.7442 
Note: Random effects GLS estimates for log hourly wage. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Earnings functions control for 










Figure 14: Predicted gender wage gaps with control for hierarchical levels 60 
 
Table 14: Wage effect of absenteeism for blue-collar workers 
(A) sample: all blue-collar workers (N=50722, n=786)   
female (dummy)  -0.1288***  -0.1288*** -0.1296***   
  [0.0073]  [0.0072] [0.0081]   
absent working hours in month / 100    0.0004     
   [0.0006]     
absent working hours in month (IV)      0.0003*   
     [0.0002]  
R-squared (overall)  0.4907  0.4907  0.4864   
        
(B) sample: all blue-collar workers with at least 24 month of observed 
employment history with the firm (N=31931, n=676) 
female (dummy)  -0.1373***  -0.1373***  -0.1374***  -0.1372*** 
 [0.0076]  [0.0076]  [0.0076]  [0.0076] 
absent working hours in month / 100    0.0008     
   [0.0006]     
sum of absent hours in last year / 100      0.0003   
     [0.0002]  
sum of absent hours in last two years / 100        -0.0002 
       [0.0002] 
R-squared (overall)  0.4403  0.4403  0.4401  0.4406 
        
(C) sample: all blue-collar workers in December 2005 (N=553, n=553) 
female (dummy)  -0.1287***  -0.1286***  -0.1254***   
 [0.0087]  [0.0087]  [0.0088]   
absent working hours in month    -0.0002     
   [0.0002]     
mean absent monthly hours     -0.0015**   
(own employment history)      [0.0006]   
R-squared 0.4539  0.4546  0.4592   
Note: Random effects GLS for sample A and B. OLS for sample C. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimates control for tenure, 




Table 15: Wage effect of absenteeism for white-collar workers 
(A) sample: all white-collar workers (N=73174, n=1250) 
female (dummy)  -0.1306***  -0.1306***  -0.1273***   
 [0.0102]  [0.0101]  [0.0191]   
absent working hours in month / 100    0.0021**     
   [0.0010]     
absent working hours in month (IV)      -0.0013***   
     [0.0005]   
R-squared (overall)  0.4351  0.4356  0.4042   
       
(B) sample: all white-collar workers with at least 24 month of observed 
employment history with the firm (N=46165, n=1021) 
female  (dummy)  -0.1373***  -0.1373*** -0.1373*** -0.1372*** 
 [0.0116]  [0.0115]  [0.0115]  [0.0114] 
absent working hours in month / 100    -0.0001     
   [0.0011]     
sum of absent hours in last year / 1000      0.0001   
     [0.0033]   
sum of absent hours in last two years / 100        -0.0002 
       [0.0002] 
R-squared  0.4567  0.4569 0.4569 0.4571 
       
(C) sample: all white-collar workers in December 2005 (N=849, n=849) 
female (dummy)  -0.0779***  -0.0779***  -0.0712***   
 [0.0139]  [0.0140]  [0.0139]   
absent working hours in month    0.0001     
   [0.0006]     
mean absent monthly hours    -0.0075***   
(own employment history)      [0.0019]   
R-squared 0.6236  0.6236  0.6296   
Note: See Table 14. 
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Table 16: Gender gap in absent working hours 
 blue-collar  workers  white-collar  workers 
female (dummy)  2.0739***  2.2047***  0.8361***  1.4528*** 
 [0.5640]  [0.5825]  [0.2789]  [0.3004] 
tenure (years)    0.4475***    0.2575*** 
   [0.1105]    [0.0531] 
tenure squared / 100    -2.4967***    -1.3872*** 
   [0.7093]    [0.3474] 
tenure cubed / 1000    0.4251***    0.2171*** 
   [0.1290]    [0.0610] 
entry age (years)    0.8447***    0.4208*** 
   [0.1677]    [0.1020] 
entry age squared / 100    -1.2860***    -0.5454*** 
   [0.2605]    [0.1554] 
apprenticeship degree (dummy)    -0.4796     
   [0.5141]     
high school degree (dummy)        -1.3246*** 
       [0.3355] 
university degree (dummy)        -2.1722*** 
       [0.3089] 
monthly working hours    -0.1249    0.0642*** 
   [0.1171]    [0.0165] 
monthly working hours squared / 100    0.0742    -0.0172** 
   [0.0482]    [0.0072] 
month yes  yes  yes  yes 
constant 5.1335***  -7.3855  3.1192***  -10.0474*** 
 [0.7381]  [7.4094]  [0.5100]  [1.8421] 
observations 50722  50722  73174  73174 
individuals 786  786  1250  1250 
R-squared (overall)  0.0120  0.0149  0.0060  0.0128 
gender gap in absenteeism in percent  30.82%  32.33%  25.73%  45.90% 
Note: Random effects GLS estimates for number of absent working hours. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Gender gap in 
percent is calculated by: 100*(predicted absent working hours females - predicted absent working hours 
males)/(predicted absent working hours males). 
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Table 17: Evolution of the gender gap in absent working hours 
  blue-collar white-collar 
female (dummy)  2.2246*** 4.9161 1.3236*** 7.8579 
  [0.5837] [34.3195] [0.3000] [10.6110] 
interaction female * age   -0.2966  -0.5242 
   [2.4925]  [0.8411] 
interaction female * squared age   0.7415  1.4424 
   [5.9314]  [2.1418] 
interaction female * cubed age   -0.0464  -0.1331 
   [0.4621]  [0.1760] 
age (years)  0.8954 1.028  0.8811**  1.0023** 
  [0.6496] [0.6816] [0.3902] [0.4626] 
age squared / 100  -2.4966 -2.8151  -2.1829**  -2.4704** 
  [1.6306] [1.7220] [0.9767] [1.1533] 
age cubed / 1000  0.2270* 0.2498*  0.1801**  0.2036** 
  [0.1322] [0.1403] [0.0789] [0.0927] 
observations  50722 50722 73174 73174 
individuals  786 786  1250  1250 
R-squared (overall)  0.0128 0.0132 0.0109 0.0110 
Note: Random effects GLS estimates for absent working hours. Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 18: Numerical example for GWG effect of statistical discrimination  
 blue-collar  workers  white-collar  workers 
female mean absent working hours  8.92  3.94 
female mean contractual working hours  147.41  138.12 
female mean absenteeism rate  6.05%  2.85% 
male mean absent working hours  6.73  3.22 
male mean contractual working hours  151.57  156.73 
male mean absenteeism rate  4.44%  2.05% 
female-male wage ratio  98.32%  99.18% 
gender wage gap  -1.7%  -0.8% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 